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The EU and the US have found themselves 
supporting two polar views on which strategy is the 
most effective in achieving stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: ‘market pull’ vs 
‘technology push’.
1 As an advocate of the latter, 
the US asserts that the principal emphasis should 
be on technology development, financed through 
typical public R&D programmes. It argues that it 
would be preferable to invest in the short term in 
R&D and to adopt emissions limitations later, 
when new technologies will have lowered the 
cost of limiting GHG emissions.
2 In supporting 
the ‘market-pull’ approach, the EU argues that 
technological change is an incremental process 
emanating primarily from business and industry, 
induced by government incentives. According 
to this logic, profit-seeking firms will respond 
with technological innovation.
3 
This paper argues that these two opposing 
positions can be explained by the respective 
political economies in the EU and the US but 
that changes are afoot that can improve the 
prospects for cooperation. In order to foster the 
convergence of views, additional conditions 
need to be fulfilled in both the EU and the US. 
The Meaning of Meeting the Global 
Climate Change Challenge 
To achieve stabilisation of GHG concentrations, 
the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development has produced estimates based on 
scenarios developed by the UN-sponsored 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). According to these calculations, there is 
a need to reduce global CO2  emissions by 22 
billion tonnes of CO2 per year by 2050 – almost 
as much as today’s total global emissions
4 (see 
Figure 1).  
* Senior Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels. 
1  See Galeotti & Carraro (2003), Grubb & Stewart 
(2004) and Goulder (2004). 
2 See Humphreys (2001) and Edmonds (2003). 
3 Grubb et al. (2002). 
4 22 Gt CO2 equals 6-7 Gt of carbon. 
Figure 1. Achieving an acceptable CO2 stabilisation 
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Source: World  Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(2004). 
This may require a peak of global emissions by around 
2020, since GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for a 
long time.
4  
To illustrate the scale of the task, one of the following 
innovations would have to be put into effect to achieve a 
reduction of just 3.3 billion tonnes out of 22 billion tonnes 
of CO2 (or 1 gigatonne out of 6-7 gigatonnes of carbon): 
increasing current global wind power capacity by 150 
times, bringing into operation 1 billion hydrogen cars to 
replace conventional 30-miles-per-gallon cars, boosting 
current nuclear capacity five-fold or using half of the 
agricultural area of the US for biomass production (see 
Table 1). 
Although there are different opinions on whether or not the 
2050 goals can be reached with technically proven 
technology, there is a broad consensus that there is a need 
for real breakthrough technology (technically unproven) 
beyond 2050. Pacala & Socolow (2004) and the IPPC 
(2001) argue that current technologies could solve the 
climate problem for the next 50 years, while Hoffert et al. 
(2002) believe that new and revolutionary technologies 
will be needed.  
There is a growing consensus that neither ‘technology 
push’ nor ‘market pull’ on its own will be able to meet the 
climate change challenge. The International Energy 
Agency, for example, argues that energy efficiency 
improvements offer the greatest potential to reduce GHG 
emissions in a 2030 perspective. Such improvements 
                                                        
4 CO2  for example, the most important GHG, stays in the 
atmosphere for 100 years. 
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depend critically on government incentives.
5 Smart 
government policy, i.e. market pull, can speed up diffusion 
of existing technologies, leading to significant reduction of 
GHG emissions in the short term. 
Table 1. The challenge: To reduce CO2 emissions by 3.3 
billion tonnes per year requires… 
Technology  Required to reduce 3.3 Gt 
CO2/yr (1 GT carbon) 
Coal-fired power plant with 
CO2 capture/storage 
700 x 1 GW plants 
Nuclear power plants replace 
average plant 
1,500 x 1 GW (5 x current) 
Wind power replaces average 
plant 
150 x current 
Solar PV displace average 
plant 
5 x 106 ha (2,000 x current) 
Hydrogen  fuel  1 billion H2 cars (CO2-free 
H2) displacing 1 billion 
conventional 30 mpg (7.84 
litres per 100 kms) cars  
Geological storage of CO2  Inject 100 mb/d fluid at 
reservoir conditions 
Biomass fuels from 
plantations 
100 x 106 ha (1/2 of US 
agricultural area) 
Source: Egenhofer & van Schaik (2005),
 based on presentation by 
ExxonMobil to a CEPS Task Force meeting on 22 October 
2004 (http://www.ceps.be/files/TF/1). 
Political economy perspectives on technology: 
Differences between the EU and US 
The EU’s short-term policy response to climate change has 
been to embrace the Kyoto Protocol, which can be 
explained by the largely synergistic relationship between 
the EU’s situation with respect to natural gas supply and 
other EU policy objectives, such as power and gas market 
liberalisation. Moreover, weak EU competencies in the 
areas of energy policy and security of supply in 
combination with relatively strong competencies in the 
fields of market liberalisation and the environment have 
forced the EU to frame climate change responses in the 
context of energy efficiency and conservation rather than 
in terms of energy policy.
6 Climate change policy has been 
coined as a ‘win-win’ situation with regards to security of 
supply, higher efficiency, more competition
7 and co-
                                                        
5 International Energy Agency (2004a). 
6 Wriglesworth & Egenhofer (2005). 
7 Market liberalisation and integration have transformed the 
traditional notion of security of supply in the EU and 
elsewhere. In competitive markets, firms in principle invest in 
those technologies that promise the highest return on capital, 
which has meant that the power generation sector favours the 
solution with minimum capital investment and the quickest 
returns. One result of EU electricity and gas market 
liberalisation has been a dash for gas, mainly in the form of 
CCGT and CHP, to the detriment of more capital-intensive 
benefits through reduction of local pollution. In a short-
term perspective, understandably technology did not play a 
major role. The relatively modest Kyoto Protocol target 
helped as well.  
More importantly, however, is the EU’s security of supply 
position with regard to natural gas and its transformation 
through gas and electricity market liberalisation. The 
strategic positions of the EU and the US in natural gas are 
profoundly different: according to the European 
Commission (2003, p. 96), ‘gas resources’ are located in 
abundant supply within an economically transportable 
distance to the EU, and the potential exists for 
technological improvements concerning gas production, 
transport by pipeline, and LNG plants and carriers. These 
reserves could cover Eurasian demand for 50 years. Hence, 
switching from coal to gas is a viable, cost-effective short-
term policy for the EU. The situation is different for the 
US, which increasingly will have to rely on liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). Hence, the share of coal in power 
generation is expected to remain stable and continue to 
account for about half of all fuels.
8 Climate policy will put 
pressure on coal. Any US alternative short of deploying 
‘carbon capture and storage’ would increase concerns 
about security of supply.  
Against the background of minimal trade-offs in the EU – 
at least in a short-term perspective – between climate 
change, security of supply and market liberalisation, it 
should come as no surprise that the energy sector has been 
broadly supportive of EU climate policy approaches and 
the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). A modest carbon 
constraint, especially when implemented through the EU 
emissions trading scheme and based on free allocation, has 
been seen in business circles as a way of enhancing 
efficiency and even security of supply, as many energy 
savings measures come at a low or even negative cost.
9 In 
addition, as long as allowances are given for free 
(‘grandfathering’), the ‘competitiveness’ effects on 
industry are minimised in general.
10  
The US situation gives a more heterogeneous picture.
11 At 
the federal or national level, there is a focus on research 
and technology programmes as well as on voluntary 
                                                                                                
generation technologies. The EU emissions trading scheme is 
another driver behind the use of gas.  
8 According to the International Energy Agency, the share of 
gas in power generation is projected to more than double in 
the period from 2002 (15%) to 2030 (35%). The European 
Commission does not rule out the possibility that 40% of total 
electricity will be produced from natural gas by that time (see 
IEA, 2004b). For US figures, see US Energy Information 
Agency (2003). 
9 See European Commission (2001). 
10 Nevertheless, a number of industries may be directly 
affected in a negative way. See Carbon Trust (2004), Renaud 
(2005), Quirion & Houcarde (2004) and Egenhofer et al. 
(2005). 
11 See Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2004) and 
Brewer (2005).  TECHNOLOGY IN A POST-2012 TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 3 
 
measures. The sub-federal level is characterised by a 
plethora of state and local government initiatives, 
including trading schemes. There are advocates of federal 
regulation, mainly in the Congress, as exemplified by the 
bipartisan McCain-Lieberman cap-and-trade legislation. 
The business community remains largely divided. 
Corporations participate in numerous voluntary initiatives 
but most of them oppose mandatory emissions limits.
12 A 
majority of US public opinion tends to favour stronger 
climate change policies than those advocated by the Bush 
administration,
13 as also do a number of religious 
organisations and churches.  
One result of the impasse over climate change policies at 
the national level has been increased activism and 
cooperation among state and local governments. It is often 
noted in this regard that there is a tradition of some states 
(especially California) taking the lead on environmental 
issues, with the national government eventually adopting 
policies that have been developed at the sub-national level. 
To some extent, this may yet happen with climate change 
policies.  
A growing coalition of Members of Congress – in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives – supports a 
policy of mandatory domestic limits on GHG emissions. 
Although the coalition is composed predominantly of 
Democrats, it includes a number of Republicans, and its 
bipartisan leadership includes Senator John McCain, a 
prominent Republican. Both the congressional coalition 
and activist state and local governments tend to hail from 
the west coast and the northeast. The economic and 
political significance of fossil fuel industries in many mid-
western and southern/southwestern states is likely to 
prevent them from following the trend towards increased 
mitigation efforts underway in the far western and 
northeastern regions of the country. But they will be open 
to technology approaches.   
The role of technology: The (only) way forward? 
With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, there may 
finally be an opportunity to move the political agenda 
beyond Kyoto into the ‘post-2012’ period. This raises the 
question of what is to be done next and what role will 
technology policy play? 
Let us look back in order to answer these questions. In the 
aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and 
especially after the US rejection of the Protocol, numerous 
alternative proposals were put forward (see Box 1).
14 In 
assessing these different approaches against 
environmental, economic or equity criteria, it quickly 
                                                        
12 Some electric power companies have, however, publicly 
advocated a mandatory cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. 
13 For a detailed review of public opinion data from 1989-
2005, see Brewer (2005b). 
14 For an overview, see Torvanger et al. (2004), Aldy et al. 
(2003), Bodansky (2004) and Kameyama (2004). See also 
Box 1.  
becomes apparent that there is no magic solution to the 
climate change challenge. It will take many years to reach 
a global consensus. But this conclusion should not be 
surprising: an effective response to climate change requires 
nothing less than aligning the national energy policies of 
more than 150 countries (see Ashton & Burke, 2004). 
Rather than ‘reinventing the wheel’, however, it seems 
only reasonable and practical to build a global agreement 
that is based on parts on the Kyoto Protocol structure, 
while at the same time accommodating a number of 
additional components, including technology. One can 
expect that we will continue to live in a differentiated 
world.  
Box 1. Different approaches to the climate change 
challenge post-2012 
•  An international agreement with absolute – Kyoto 
style – targets, but with modifications such as a safety 
valve, i.e. a maximum price on allowances 
•  Energy or carbon-intensity targets to improve energy 
efficiency; the ultimate target can be a fixed per capita 
emissions target per country 
•  Linkages, i.e. linking participation to R&D 
cooperation or financial transfers 
•  Environmental conditionality in which emissions 
trading is linked to environmental ‘progress’, e.g. the 
Green Investment Scheme or trade-and-back 
approaches 
•  Sector-specific targets, i.e. a coordinated approach 
for domestic policies 
•  Coordinated global carbon taxes 
•  Technology development and international 
cooperation on R&D activities 
•  A combination of different instruments, including 
intensity targets, sector-specific domestic measures 
and technology development in the so-called ‘triptych 
approach’ 
•  Orchestration of treaties focusing on different co-
existing commitments under different legal 
frameworks 
Source: Egenhofer & van Schaik (2005). 
The Next Priorities in a Technology Perspective 
Most scholars and analysts attribute the EU-US climate 
change disagreement to divergent views on climate 
science, the role of domestic versus international action, 
technology, costs, the role of developing countries and the 
Kyoto Protocol process itself.
15 In order to overcome the 
‘climate divide’, there is a need for some convergence in 
all of these areas. This will take time, however.  
In the meantime, we have argued on other occasions 
(Egenhofer, 2005) that the EU and the US (governments 
and stakeholders) should concentrate on three areas likely 
to be critical for the EU-US climate change agenda: i) a 
                                                        
15 See Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994 and 1998), Harris 
(2000), Purvis & Meuller (2004) and Michael (2005). 4 | Christian Egenhofer 
 
(common) sense of direction, ii) a determination to make 
the EU climate change policy work and iii) technology 
policy. Progress in these areas is a prerequisite for a more 
constructive transatlantic dialogue.  
A (Common) Sense of Direction 
The first important step is to forge a common 
understanding between the US and the EU on the urgency 
of climate change and to demonstrate together the will to 
achieve more ambitious reductions and technological 
innovation. The EU has tried to provide direction after EU 
heads of governments in March 2005 endorsed a target to 
limit the global average temperature increase to 2°C and 
indicated a willingness to explore with other countries 
ways to reach a reduction target for industrialised countries 
of 15-30% for GHG emissions by 2020 on a 1990 basis. 
The UK has used its G8 presidency to develop a package 
of practical measures to cut emissions, focusing largely on 
technology as well as on building a partnership with 
rapidly developing economies to find a way to combine 
economic growth with a low-carbon economy. This is an 
opportunity to inject fresh political momentum in the 
efforts to reach a new global consensus. The focus on 
technology and developing countries as the keys to 
tackling climate change has been a principal US demand 
for some time. It is important, however, that this new 
strategy not only responds to the concerns of the current 
US administration, but also to those of other stakeholders, 
notably business, as reflected in the following remark by a 
representative of Tony Blair’s government: “Business and 
the global economy need to know that this isn’t an issue 
that is going to go away”.
16 As we have shown, most US 
stakeholders accept that climate change policy will become 
a necessity in the long-run. 
Making EU Climate Change Policy Work  
It is therefore up to the EU to show that climate change 
policy can be undertaken without ruining the economy. 
Implementation of the EU ETS has already given strong 
signals to the US. Successful EU performance can help 
change the minds of US stakeholders. The EU ETS is 
attracting increasing interest throughout the world and not 
just by the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. US scholars 
are watching the EU ETS intensively. The total value of 
current EU allowances of permits stands at far more than 
€50 billion, at an allowance price of around €20. This 
might be too big a market to ignore. It is also often 
forgotten that climate change policy can have important 
benefits beyond climate policy objectives. Such co-
benefits of climate change measures are the reduction of 
local pollution caused by NOx or SO2, less congestion or 
noise from transport, innovation and technological 
leapfrogging and employment.
17 In fact, most studies 
assume that the benefits of reducing local air pollution are 
                                                        
16 See Derwent (2005). 
17 See Jochen & Madlener (2003). 
higher than the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
(see OECD, 2002). In short, climate policy is likely to 
have significant benefits that are not yet explicitly 
acknowledged. The experiences of BP, Entergy, Toyota or 
Rio Tinto show that reducing GHG emissions can yield net 
profits.
18 Finally, as the case of the Kyoto Protocol 
illustrates, when the US is absent, other countries will 
proceed to define the international agenda as they deem 
most appropriate. A global or even transatlantic GHG 
emissions market may offer the best hope for a less 
fragmented business environment.
19 
Technology Development 
Given that medium-term targets will be more constraining 
than the current ones specified in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
EU will require more radical changes, which are likely to 
lead to greater distributional consequences.
20This will 
require a further development of EU climate change policy 
along the lines of the recent European Commission (2005) 
Communication on Winning the Battle against Global 
Climate Change, which listed the various elements of a 
global strategy which notably included technology. 
Since longer-term targets can only be met by the 
development of new technologies and the massive 
diffusion of both new and existing technologies, the EU 
also needs a greater focus on technology. What this means 
in practice will still need to be developed in the coming 
years.  
                                                        
18 BP calculated that reducing GHG emissions by 10% below 
its 1990 level has a net benefit of $650 million (see Browne, 
2004). 
19 If one believes leading global business associations, there is 
a growing concern about an increasingly fragmented or even 
disintegrating regulatory framework.  One of the recurrent 
themes of business responses is the creation of a greenhouse 
gas emissions market. According to Steve Lennon, Chairman 
of the Environment and Energy Commission of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), whose 
membership includes major US companies, business sees a 
“global system of emissions trading as inevitable” (see 
Harvey, 2005). 
20 See two CEPS multi-stakeholder Task Force reports that 
analyse these issues: Egenhofer & van Schaik (2005) and 
Egenhofer & Fujiwara (2005). TECHNOLOGY IN A POST-2012 TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 5 
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